RECENT CASES.
BI.LS AND NOTEs-BoNA FIDE HOLDER UNDER NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

IAw -The plaintiff in an action to recover on two promissory notes proved
himself to be a purchaser for value before maturity. The defendant offered
evidence of notice in order to prove bad faith, and the case was tried on
the theory that every person who has actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry, and who omits to make such inquiry with reasonable diligence is deemed to have "constructive notice" of
the fact itself, as provided by Sections 6702 and 67o3 of the Revised Codes
of North Dakota, 1905. The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for
the defendant. On appeal the Court held, that the above-mentioned sections
of the Codes, since the enactment of the Negotiable Instruments Law, have
no application to actions upon negotiable instruments in the hands of indorsees before maturity, being superseded by Section 6358 (N. I. L., Section 56), defining notice in such case as "actual knowledge of the infirmity
or defect or knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instruamounted to bad faith." American Nat. Bank v. Lundy, 129 N. W.
ment
99 (N. D.), iIO.
This decision is in accord with the weight of authority as to what constitutes bad faith in one taking a negotiable instrument before maturity.
The rule of "constructive notice" prevalent in other branches of the law,
was in England, held, applicable to commercial paper in Gill v. Cubitt, 3
Barn & C. 466 (1824). This doctrine was overthrown several years later
by Goodman v. Harvey, 4 Ad. & El. 870 (1836), Lord Denman, C. J., saying: "Gross negligence may be evidence of mala fides, but it is not the
same thing. Where the bill has passed to the plaintiff without any proof
of bad faith in him, there is no objection to his title." This rule has not
been shaken in England and has long prevailed in this country, though some
few jurisdictions have followed Gill v. Cubitt (supra), I Daniel Neg. Inst.,
4th Ed., 770. It is incorporated in the Negotiable Instruments Law, Section
56. (For cases decided under this section see Brauman, "The Negotiable
Instruments Law," 2d Ed., 62.) "The rights of the holder are to be determined by the simple test of honesty and good faith, and not by the speculative issue as to his diligence or negligence." O'Brien, J., in Cheever v.
Pittsburgh R. Co., i5o N. Y. 65 (1896).
The Court in the principal case, however, was justified in holding Section 6703 inapplicable. It is found in Chapter ioi of the Revised Codes,
1905, entitled, "Definitions and General Provisions." This chapter is general in its scope, as the title would indicate, defining, inter alia, "constructive
notice" as a legal phrase. The "Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law" was
originally enacted in North Dakota, Revised Codes, 1899, Chapter ioo, and
"governs as to all negotiable instruments executed on and after July x,
1899." This latter phrase would seem to except the subject matter of the
chapter from the operation of the more general sections of the Code.
CRIMEs-FALsE

PRETENCE-STATE OF MIND AS AN EXISTING FAcT.-On

appeal assigning for error a charge that "if A buys property intending not
to pay for it, he obtains that property by false pretence," it was held, that,
aside from the question whether a man's present intention as to a future
act is a fact, such a fraud was not intended by the legislature to be the
statutory crime of larceny by 'false pretences. Com. v. Althause, 92 N. E.
202 (Mass., igio).
(404)
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Th6 general rule,- universally adopted, is that a pretence, within the
meaning of the statute, is a representation of a fact as existing, or as having existed. A promissory pretence to do an act is not within the statute.
Cor. v. Moore, 99 Pa. 574 (1882). See 19 Cyc. 397, note 57. Interpreting
this rule logically, a misrepresentation of one's intention to do a thing in
the future is a misrepresentation of an existing fact, "for the state of a
man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion ;" and this view
has been adopted by many jurisdictions with respect to civil actions for fraud.
Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. D" 459 (1885); Swift v. Rounds, ig R. L
527 (1896). To admit such an interpretation in criminal cases would be to
overthrow the fundamental principle that a promispory pretence is not
within the statute. State v. Blanchard, go N. Y. 314 (1882); and for this
reason the courts, although recognizing the logic of the theory, have always
avoided the perplexing question. See remark by Wells, J., in Reg. v. GorSome few cases can be found which, in their
don, 23 I. B. D. 354 (r889).
facts, will support the logical conclusion, but in none of these cases did the
court squarely state, or even intimate, that a misrepresentation of one's
present intention is a misrepresentation of an existing fact, but, on the
contrary, in each case is expressly stated a doctrine irreconcilable with the
result reached that a promissory pretence is not indictable. State v. Dome,
27 Ia. 273 (1869); State v. Cowdin, 28 Kan. 269 (1882); State v. Nichols,
i Houston 114 (Del., x862). It is submitted that in these cases the courts
erred in interpreting a promise as an existing fact. In other cases; although
the courts have gone very far, as, for example, in holding that a misrepresentation of a power, seemingly psychic and consequently a mental state,
is a misrepresentation of an existing fact, still they have refused to take
the final step. Reg. v. Lawrence, 36 L. T. 404 (877).
The controversy has been settled in England by statute providing, inter
alia, that a promise as to future conduct not intended to be kept is not by
itself a false pretence. 62 and 63 Vict., C. 22.
REFUSAL TO DEAL-WANT OF JUsEQUITY-BLACKLISTING-CoNCERTED
TIFICATION.-In Arbour v. Pittsburg P. T. Asso., 229 Pa. 24o, the plaintiff

filed a bill in
their by-laws.
were members
In accordance

equity to restrain
The plaintiff was
of an incorporated
with ,their by-laws

certain actions of the defendants under
a retail produce dealer. The defendants
association of wholesale produce dealers.
the defendants refused to deal either on

credit or for cash with the plaintiff, until the plaintiff paid a disputed claim
the defendants had against him, or agreed to submit the matter to arbitrators
chosen by the defendants and members of their association. The plaintiff
alleged damage to his business and the court enjoined the acts in question,
and declared void the by-laws under which they were committed. This
conclusion is correct according to the modern view. The court occupies
most of its opinion in justifying its jurisdiction in passing on the by-laws
of a corporation of this character, and seems to take for granted the illegality of the by-laws in question and the defendants' acts thereunder. The
apparent ground of their conclusion in the latter question is that: "The
plaintiff was not a member, and his business standing and credit with other
dealers, as well as his lawful claims, demands and defences, were disposed
of without regard to the forms prescribed by our legal procedure."
The case seems to be a plain instance of a concerted refusal to deal
between two parties resulting in injury to one of them, the plaintiff. So
many courts have held to the view that the right to refuse to deal between
two parties is absolute and cannot be questioned (e. g., Bohn Mfg. Co. v.
Hollis, 54 Minn. 223 [r893]), that it would not have been amiss for the
court to give their reasons for adopting the more radical view, that even
between two parties the exercise of a right of this class which results in
injury, requires justification. There is, however, to be found an increasing number of cases which have taken this view, and held the exercise of
the right to refuse to deal not justified by a variety of objects; Carew v.
Rutherford, 1o6 Mass. 1 (1870) (the object was to collect a fine imposed

RECENT CASES
by the defendant association on the plaintiff, a non-member); Ryan v.
Burger & Howe Brewing Co., I3 N. Y. Sup. 66 (i8gi) (the object was to
collect a claim for which the.plaintiff was not liable at law); Boutwell v.
Marr, 42 Atl. 607 (Vt., i89) (the object was to collect a fine imposed by
the defendant association on the plaintiff, a non-member). In the two last
cases there appeared to be some evidence of economic coercion of the
minority of the association, thus giving the cases the aspect of three party
cases, or "boycotts." This view having once been adopted, the want of
justification is apparent, for the sole object of the defendants was to collect disputed claims without having them passed on by the courts. The
court below, whose ruling was affirmed, said that the conduct of the defendants constituted a "combination and monopoly in restraint of trade." It
is submitted that in all cases of this class the characteristics of combination and monopoly in the defendants' acts are a practical necessity to accomplish the injury complained of, but are not necessary legal component
parts of the act.
It is possible that the fact that the members of the defendant association had been incorporated by the State, and had thus received the benefits
and franchises of incorporation rendered the court more ready to hold
them for unsocial conduct.
CRRIERs-LIABILaTY TO PASSENGERS FOR INSULT BY SmivANT.-In May
v. Shreveport Traction Co., 53 So. 671 (La. 191o), the plaintiff, a Caucasian,
boarded a car of the defendant company, with compartments for "white"
and "colored," as required by statute. She took her seat in the compartment for "white" persons. When the conductor came to collect her fare,
pointing to the seats for "colored" passengers, he said: "Don't you belong
over there?" He then proceeded to collect fares in another part of the
car, and, when passing the plaintiff on his return, she asked what he meant.
The conductor replied: "You are in the wrong seat; you belong over
there." The conductor was disposed to end the conversation, but the plaintiff continued it until she left the car. It was held, that the plaintiff could
recover for the humiliation and embarrassment caused by the remarks of
the conductor.
It is generally held that where there has been no physical impact but
the passenger has been insulted by an employe of the carrier, recovery may
be had; but it must be noted that the language used in these cases has been
more malicious than in the leading case. Gillespie v. Brooklyn Heights
R. R. Co., 178 N. Y. 347 (904), passenger charged with beating way; L. & N.
R. R. Co. v. Donaldson, ig Ky. L- R. 1384 (1897), same; Cole v. A. & W.
P. R. R., io2 Ga. 474 (1897), same; Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Tarkington, 27 Tex.
Civ. App. 353 (igoi), same; C. N. 0. & T. P. Ry. v. Harris, 115 Tenn.
5oi (i9o5), same; Lafitte v. L. & N. 0., C. & L. R. R., 43- La. Am. 34
(i8qi), passenger charged with passing counterfeit note. The case of
Knoxville Traction Co. v. Lane, io3 Tenn. 376 (i899), more closely resememploye
bles the leading case, but the language used was slanderous, thepassengers
imputing unchastity to the passenger: "The contract to carry
on its
is not one of mere toleration and duty to transport the passengerto guarcars, but it also includes the obligation on the part of the carrier
protect
antee to its passengers respectful and courteous treatment, and to against
them not only from violence and insults from strangers, but also
violence and insult from the carrier's own servants." In some cases the words
liability is unquesand acts would constitute an assault, in which case, the S.
W. IO65 (Tex.,
tioned. Inter. Nati. & G. N. R. Co. v. Henderson, 82
I9O4) ; Gulf, C.
1904) ; St. L., S. W. Ry. v. Wright, 84 S. W. 27o (Tex.,
& S. F. Ry. v. Luther, 4o Tex. Civ. App. 517 (I9o5).
and
The leading case is certainly an extreme extension of the liability,Little
reached.
on exactly similar facts an opposite conclusion has been
Rock Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Putsche, 1o4 S. W. 554 (Ark., I9o7.) See also So.
"But if he
Ry. in Ky. v. Thurman, 121 Ky. 716 (igo6), similar facts:
care
(brakeman) -in good faith believed and in the exercise of ordinary
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had a right to believe that she was a woman of color and was not insulting
to her, the jury should find for the defendantf Daniels v. F. C. & P. R. L,
62 S. C. z (I9oI): "The conpany is not liable for strict business languagefirm, business-like talk--but if the rudeness goes to such extent as to be
abusive, I would not charge you that the railroad is not liable."
The following cases deny the proposition that where there is abuse

without physical injury, there is nevertheless recover.

Spol v. Mo. Fa.

Ry, xx6 to. &17 (I893); Grayson v. St. L Transit Co., io Mo. App. 6o
(19o3); Taylor v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R, 78 S. C. 55 (1907).
In view of the racial feeling in Louisiana, the words used by the conductor undoubtedly were of a more slanderous nature than had they been
spoken in the North, but the decision is certainly a questionable one.

Cbsrs-LrAmuvy oF hIwrr -zo Ixanmnpy NuxT Fzum-An action,
properly instituted and conducted, by a next friend in the interest of an
infant, having been dismissed with costs and damages to be paid by the
next friend, in a subsequent suit, the infant was heLd, bound to indemnify
the next friend against such costs and damages, and the costs, charges and
expenses properly incurred in relation to the former action. Steeden v.
Waldon, 2 CL. 393 (1910).
According to some authorities an infant plaintiff suing by guardian,
ad liten, or next friend, is liable for costs; Whittaker v. Marlar, I Cox 285
(I6)
; Myers v. Rehkopf, 3a IL App. --m (1888); Howett v. Alexander,
xz N. C. 43i (1828); this is denied by other anthorities. Holmes v. Adkins,
2 Ind. 398 (185o); Waring v. Crane, 2 Paige 79 (N. Y., 183o); Stephenson
v. Stephenson, 3 Hayw. ij23 (Tenn. x8x6). A few cases hold both the
infant and next friend liable Turner v. Turner, 2 P. Wins. 297 (725);
Albee v. Winterin, 55 Iowa 184 (188o). Apart from statdte by the weight

of authority in England and this country the next friend is liable in the
first instance. Aderton v. Yates, 5 Deg. & Sm. 2o (1852); Caley v. Caley,
W. N. 89 (x87j7); Smith v. Gafford, 33 Ala. 68 (i858); Rauche v. Blinen-

thai, 4 Penuew.-521 (Del -1904); Wainwright v. Wilkinson, 62 Md. 146

([884); contra, Crandall v. Slaid, 52 Mlass. 288 (z846); Soule v. Winslow,
64 Me. 518 (1874). In many States statutes make the next friend primarily liable. Robidon v. Judge, xio Mich. 297 (z896); Wead v. Cantwell,
43 N. Y. 528 (1885); Burbach v. Ry. Co., 119 Wis. 384 (19o3). His liability is undoubted where the suit was improper or unnecessary. Pearce v.
Pearce, 9 Ves, Jr_ 548 (]8o4); Campbell v. Campbell, 2 My. & Cr. 25 (1837);
Thomas v. Elsum, L J. P- 46 Ch. D. 793 (1877). As was said by Lord
Langdale, in Cross v. Cross, 8 Beav. 455 (1845). "there is considerable
difficulty in dealing with cases of this kind. On the one hand, there is
danger of encouraging useless and expensive litigation on behalf of infants
by strangers; on the other hand, you may discourage interference, which
very often is absolutely necessary for their protection."
Since the next friend is liable in the first instance in England, the
prinipal case seems clearly right in allowing the action over against the
infant, as he is the real party in interest. Though the question is res ixtegra
in England, in many cases property of the infant under control of the
court has been made available to meet the next friend's expenses and liabilities. Clayton v. Clarke;, 7 Jur. (N. S.) -6z (1863); IX re Jones, W. N.
14 (883); Sanderson's Admrs. v. Sanderson, 2o Fla. 292 (i883); contra,
Lindley, L. J.; In re Fish, 2 Ch. 422 (893); Insurance Co. v. Van Rensselaer, 4 Paige 85 (N. Y., 1833). Dicta in support of the principal case are
found in Taner-v. Jore. 2 Ves. Sr. 465 (1752); Pritchard v. Roberts, L R.
17 Eq. 2= (1873): This is law in America. Voorhees v. Polhemus, 36
N. J. Eq. 456 (1883).
DESCENT-REfEASE OF AN FXECrANCy rN LUFIM

OF ANCESTOZ--HELD

VOI Ir EQurT--A recent decision in South Dakota is to the effect that
the release by an heir of his interest in the estate of the ancestor, made
in the lifetime of the latter, is inoperative and void. In re Tompson's Estate, z28 N. W. Rep. I7 (S. D., 1go).
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There was no question of inadequacy of the consideration raised; and
noise of fraud, the court giving as their reason, for the decision, that this
was a release of a mere expectancy not coupled *ith an interest, and as
such void under Sections 215 and 918 of the Civil Code, which adopted the
common law rules on this subject. These sections were copied from similar
ones in a proposed Civil Code for New York State, and the New York
cases cited by the Code Commissioners of that State, as a basis for the
sections in question, are referred to, and quoted from, with approval by
the court in the present case.
,While not specifically stating so, the court alpareintly decide the question in equity as well as at law. There is no doubt that at law such a
release would be invalid; but the weight of authority is in favor of upholding it in equity. Batham v. McKneely, 89 Ga. 812; Power's Appeal, 63 Pa.
4AI:, Smith v. Smith, 59 Me. 214; Havens v. Thompson, 26 N. J. Eq. 383;
Daniel v. Lewis, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 827; 2 Story Eq. Jur., 13th Ed., Section
Io4ob; and 2 Pomeroy Eq. Jur., 3d Ed., Section 953. In Daniel v. Lewis
the Court spoke of the release as including a covenant of non-claim; and
the Court in the present case intimates that, had there been a covenant
of warranty by the heir, there might, have been an equitable estoppel, which
would have necessitated a different decision; but it is submitted that this
distinction is more apparent than real, and that the two cases are in fact
contra. The ground of the authorities deciding against the view adopted
in the principal case is that the release, being for an adequate consideration, and no fraud appearing, is enforcible in equity. This view is considered at some length in Pomeroy, supra. In Indiana a release for a money
consideration operates as an advancement of the amount, and does not
bar the heir. Stokesbury, et al., v. Reynolds, 57 Ind. 425. In Illinois, where
the release is in consideration of a transfer of real estate to the value of
the interest which the heir has, or rather would get, in the ancestor's estate,
it operates as a bar to his participation in the distribution of same; and the
statute of advancements does not apply. Bishop, et al., v. Davenport, et al.,
58 Ill. io5. A similar statute is in force in indiana, and the two jurisdictions seem to have the same views on the question, and to be in accord
with the weight of authority, where the case is not affected by the statute
just referred to.
The only decisions which go as far as that in the principal case are
those in New York, which were made the basis of the sections in the proposed code for that State, later adopted in the code of South Dakota. It
may even be doubted whether two of these go so far as the court in the
present case appears to think they do; and they certainly represent the
minority view, in any event
EVIDENcEr-CRIMINAL PROSECUTION-RESEM13LANCF OF CHILD AS EVIDENCE OF INTERCOURSE.-On a trial for carnal abuse of a female under the

age of sixteen, the Supreme Court of Arkansas allowed the production before the jury of the child of the female and permitted her to testify that
the child was the result of the intercourse with accused. Cook v. State,
132 S. W. 455 (Ark., igio).
There is no little conflict in the authorities as to whether it is competent to introduce parol testimony relative to the resemblance between the
child and defendant in cases of bastardy, seduction, carnal abuse, and the
like. In England testimony upon such resemblance seems to have been almost uniformly received. Douglas Case, 2 Coll. Jur. 402 (1769); Day v
Day, iubback, Evid. of Succession, 384 (1797); Burnaby v. Baillie, 42 Ch.
.Div. 282 (1889); and in the Tichborne Case (187), Cockburn, C. J., held
the resemblance of the claimant to a family daguerreotype was relevant.
The weight of authority in the United States seems to be against the admission of such evidence. In re Jessup, 81 Cal. 408 (r889) ; Jones v. Jones,
45 Md. 144 (1876) ; U. S. v. Collins, I Cranch 592 (I8io); contra, Sheehan's
Est., 139 Pa. I68 (189I).
The same conflict exists upon the question whether a child may be
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exhibited to the jury as evidence of relationship; although some courts
which prohibit testimony upon resemblance permit the jury to determine
from inspection whether any personal resemblance exists. Shorter v. Judd,
56 Kan. 43 (1895); Jones v. Jones, supra. The principal case would seem
t6 be in accord with the weight of authority in America on the admissibility
of this kind of demonstrative evidence. Gilmanton v. Ham, 38 N. H.
Io8 (1859); Finnegan v. Dugan, 96 Mass. 197 (1867); St. v. Horton, ioo
N. C. 443 (I888) ; Crow v. Jordon, 49 Oh. St. 655 (x892). Some courts go
so far as to allow counsel to comment on the similarity of features of the
infant and its putative father. St. v. Danforth, 72 N. H. 215 (I905), and
cases cited. In other States the child may not be exhibited to the jury for
the purpose of proving paternity by resemblance. Robnett v. People, I6
Ill. App. 299 (1885); Risk v. St., 19 Ind. 152 (1862); Fuller v. Carney, 36
N. Y. 47 (1883); Hanawalt v. St., 64 Wis. 84 (1885). The mere presence
of the child in court within the vision of the jury in a prosecution for bastardy is not ground for complaint. People v. White, 53 Mich. 537 (884);
Hutchinson v. St., i9 Neb. 262 (1886). So the child may be brought into
court, in a prosecution for rape, to corroborate the testimony of the prosecutrix, and its birth and identity as a result of the illicit intercourse may be
shown, although it can not be introduced to show resemblance to defendant.
St. v. Ned, 23 Utah 541 (89).
It is sdbmitted that the best rule is to admit the child in evidence only
where it has attained an age when its features have assumed some degree
of maturity or permanency. The argument for this qualified admission rule
given in Clark v. Bradstreet, 8o Me. 454 (1888) has been quoted with approval in several recent cases. "While it may be a well known physiological
fact that peculiarities of form and feature are often transmitted from
parent to child, yet it is equally true that during the first few months of a
child's existence it has that peculiar immaturity of features which characterize it as an infant, and that it changes very much in looks and appearance during that period." Resemblance is then more imaginary than real.
Copeland v. St., 40 S. W. 589 (Tex., 1897); St. v. Smith, 54 Iowa io4
(i88o); compare St. v. Harvey, 12 Iowa 416 (19oo); Shorten v. Judd,
supra. But this discrimination as to age was expressly disapproved in Adams
v. St., 124 S. W. 766 (Ark., I9IO); Scott v. Donovan, 153 Mass. 378 (i89r);
Garret v. St., 5o N. J. L. 49o (888).
EVIBENCE-PARoLE EVIDENCE ADMIssIBLE TO EXPLAIN A BOND.-In the
case of Kernodle v. Williams, et al., 69 S. E. 431 (N. C., igio), action was
brought on a bond. The defendants admitted the execution of the bond
and set up a further agreement showing that the money had been given by
the father to his children, and the bond given by way of receipt and not to
operate as an obligation unless the money was needed to meet the calls
upon the executor for payment of debts. The plaintiff was the father of
the obligors. It was decided by a divided court that the admission of such
evidence was proper.
The decision proceeded on the ground. that while parole evidence is
not admissible to vary, alter or contradict a written agreement, the evidence in the case at bar did not have that effect, but merely added certain
terms of the agreement which had not previously been reduced to writing.
That is, that the entire contract was composed of the parole as well as the
written terms, and therefore admission of the evidence was not a change
but an addition.
There is some authority for the reasoning employed as well as for the
result reached. The fundamental principle, it is stated, is that deeds and
specialties cannot be explained or varied in their signification by parole evidence if the terms made use of in the instrument are capable of sensible
explanation of themselves; and that the rule extends to any written contract. Stackpole v. Arnold, iI Mass. 27 (1814); Brown on Parole Evidence, Section I. The reason for the existence of such a rule is equally
stated by Coke 3, 26. "Also it would be inconvenient that matters in writ-
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Ing made by advice and upon consideration, and which finally import the
certain truth of the agreement of the parties should be controlled by
the averments of the parties to be proved by-the uncertain testimony of slippery memory." Courts have found it necessary to introduce many qualifications to this rule, and it cannot be doubted that evidence is always admissible where the original contract was verbal and entire and part only
reduced to writing. Chapin v. Dobson, 78 N. Y. 74 (I879), or where there
is a collateral agreement not embraced in the written one. Brown, Parole
Evid., Section 5o, and cases cited. In Brook v. Latimer, 44 Kan. 431 (i8go),
in a suit upon a promissory note evidence that this was by way of an advancement by father to child, and that the note was a mere receipt was
admitted on the ground that the consideration recited is always the subject of judicial inquiry. Under the authorities there seems to be strong
ground for the decision in'the principal case.
It would seem, however, that this is a dangerous extension of the law.
While it may be admitted that, strictly speaking, the evidence did not vary
the written instrument as to the words used, yet it did effect a change in
that its character was completely altered. What was formerly an obligation to pay became an acknowledgment of payment. It would be hard to
imagine a greater antithesis.. There is no suggestion of fraud or mistake.
There appears to be no reason for allowing the evidence. It is admitted
that, granting the facts to be true, the case is a hard one, but this is no
reason for allowing the parties who have had recourse to the dignity of a
legal instrument to go behind their solemn declaration. Keeping in mind
the reason for the rule excluding parole evidence the case seems to be
within the strict letter of the law, but far outside its spirit. Nor is this view
of the case unsupported by authority. Many cases have held that evidence
may not be admitted to show an instrument .purporting to be an obligation
is a mere receipt. Clarke v. Allen, 132 Pa. 40 (i8go); Shaw v. Shaw, So
Me. 94 (1863); Billings v. Billings, io Cush. 178 (i89o). It will be noted
that the bond in the present case was given for a valuable present consideration so that the evidence could not have been admitted to show failure
of consideration. On the whole, the dissenting opinion is a far "more convincing staterient of what the law should be on this disputed point, although
it is impossible to say that the decision as rendered conflicts with existing
authorities.
EVIDENCE-PRESUMPTION OF SURVIVORSHP-INSURANCE.-A casualty insurance policy provided that the indemnity should be paid to the beneficiary
named therein, or in event of her "prior death" to the legal representatives of
the deceased. The assured and the beneficiary named perished in the "Slocum
disaster" and the survivorship was unascertainable. Held: The intention
of the assured as expressed in the language of the contract was that the
beneficiary should not take under the policy unless she survived the assured.
The burden was therefore upon the representatives of the beneficiary to
prove her survivorship, and since that burden was not satisfied the proceeds
of the policy passed to the subsequent claimants, the legal representatives of
the assured. Dunn v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., x62 N. Y. Supp. 229
(IgO).
Under the civil law, where several persons lose their lives in a common
disaster, there is a presumption of survivorship based upon the age, sex and
strength of the various persons. Louisiana and California have a4opted
similar presumptions in their codes. Grand Lodge, etc., v. Miller, 96 Pac. Rep.
22 (Cal. i9o8). The common law, however, recognizes no presumption
either of survivorship or of simultaneous death. The person whose rights
are conditional upon the survivorship of any particular person must prove
that such person did in fact survive. Survivorship must be proved by the
party asserting it. Wing v. Angrave, 8 H. L. Cas. 183 ('86o). This is settled
law, but it is difficult to determine upon whom the burden of proof rests
in a given case. Where a testamentary devige is in question the English
courts interpret the language of the condition literally and sometimes defeat

RECENT CASES

411

what seems to be the obvious intention of the testator. Elliot v. Smith, 22
Ch. Div. 236 (1882).
The American courts have adopted a more liberal and reasonable mode
of construction. They give to the language of the condition the meaning
it had to the testator. Y. W. C. A. v. French, 187 U. S. 4oi (1902). The
principal case applies the same rule of construction to cases of insurance
contracts and is in accord with the weight of authority. Hildebrandt v.
Ames, 66 S. W. Ren. 311 (Tex. i9o0). Where, however, no right to change
the beneficiary is reserved it has been held that the beneficiary has a vested
interest in the policy, which is divested only by his prior death, and a subsequent claimant can succeed only by proof of the beneficiary's prior death.
U. S. Casualty Co. v. Kacer, T69 Mo. 3oz (190o2).
HUSBAND AND WIFE-STATUTES-WIFE'S RIGHT TO SUE HUSBAND FOR
PERSONAL TORT.-Tn Thompson v. Thompson, 31 Sup. Ch. Rep. III (i9iO), a

majority of the United States Supreme Court held a statute authorizing married women "to sue separately for the recovery, security, or protection of their
property, and for torts committed against them, as fully and freely as if they
were unmarried," did not give the wife a right of action to recover damages
from her husband for an assault and battery committed by him upon her
person. Mr. Justice Harlan dissented, with him, Holmes and Hughes, JJ.
The differences of opinion was whether the act should be confined to property actions or given a broader construction. It would seem there is much
to be said for a broader interpretation of such Acts. Sykes v. Speer, 112
L=W.42 (Tex. I9O8).

Arising out of the common law doctrine of the legal unity of husband
and wife is the general rule that neither spouse can sue the other at law,
except as authorized by statute. Stewart. Husband and Wife, §39 and cases
cited. While the enabling acts have to a large extent separated the personality of the wife from that of her husband, and removed most of her disabilities, the few reported cases support the narrow construction given the Act
in the principal case. Peters v. Peters, 42 Iowa 182 (1875); Longendyke v.
Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366 (N. Y. 1863); Freethy v. Freethy, 42 Barb. 641
(N. Y. i865); Decker v. Kedley, 79 C. C. A. 3o5 (i9o6). And this disability
continues after divorce. Phillips v. Barnet, L. R. I. Q. B. D. 436 (1876); Main
v. Main, 46 Ill. App. io6 (1892) ; Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304 (1877) ; Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 8o (i898) ; Strom v. Strom, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.)
191 (Minn. 19o6). Contra: Shultz v. Shultz, 27 Hun. 27, reversed in 89 N.
Y. App. 644 (1882); dicta in Wilson v. Wilson, 36 Cal. 447 (868), overruled
in Peters v. Peters, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 699 (Cal. igog), where a husbaibd's
right to maintain an action against his wife for a personal injury was denied.
With equal unanimity tort actions to recover property are maintainable by
married women against their husbands; ejectment, Cook v. Cook, 125 Ala.
583 (i9oo); detinue, Lamed v. Lamed, 2 K. B. 539 (905); trover, Smith v.
Smith, 2o R. I. 556 (1898); Gillespie v. Gillespie, 64 Mim. 381 (1896);

replevin, White v. White, 58 Mich. 546 (1885) ; Howland v. Howland, 20 Hun
472 (N. Y. i88o); contra, Hobbs v. Hobbs, 70 Me. 383 (188o).
The doctrine is sometimes stated in general words, that husband and
wife may sue each other in equity, Cannel v. Buckle, 2 P. Wins. 243 (1724);
Porter v. Bank, I9 Vt. 410 (1847), 2 Story Eq. Jur. 699; but the later authorities limit this right to cases in which questions concerning property arise.
Lombard v. Morse, 155 Mass. 136 (i89T); Buttlar v. Buttlar, 67 N. J. Eq. 136
(19o4); Heckman v. Heckman, 215 Pa. 203 (i9o6); I Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. §Wg.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-LIABILITY TO PAY RENT WHERE BENEFICIAL ENJOYMENT IS MADE ILLEGAL.-In the recent New York case of Adler v. Miles,
126 N. Y. S. 135, a lessor brought an action for rent against the defendant
as surety of the lessee. A tenement house had been leased "to be used and
occupied for the purpose of a place of amusement for the exhibition of moving pictures and no other purpose whatsoever," and the defense was that
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prior to the accrtial of the rent sued for the Mayor of New York,
acting
under an ordinance, had prohibited moving picture licenses for tenement
houses, and that without such license the activity was illegal. Held: The defendant is not liable on the covenant as surety unless his principal would be
liable, and the latter is not liable because the law has made the performance
of the contract impossible and it is therefore rescinded. To hold the defendant under the altered circumstances of the law would be to hold him to a
contract he never made.
The conclusion seems to be correct. As the court says: "The general rule
was declared in the old case of Paradine v. Jane, Alevyn's Reports, 26, 27:
'Where a party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he
is bound to make it good if he may, notwithstanding any accident by inevitable
necessity, because he might have provided against it by his contract.' This
general rule does not apply where performance becomes impossible by a
change in the law or by reason of action taken under governmental authority.
In such case, the reason for the general rule does not exist. The parties to
the lease contracted with a view to the law as it existed at the time the lease
was made. To hold them bound to anticipate future legislation would be
equivalent to making them obligate themselves to the performance of conditions .prescribed by others, which in the nature of things could not have been
in the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was made."
This exception to the general rule is supported by a distinct line of New York
cases. Jones v. Judd, 4 N. Y. 411; People v. Insurance Co., 91 N. Y. 174;
Church v. Mayor, 5 Con. 538, and seems to be accepted in England: Chitty
on Contracts, I5th Ed. 711, and cases cited. In Rooks v. Leaton, i Phila.
io6, it is held that when after performance of a contract by one party, performance of the other is prohibited by law, and the latter party insists upon
retaining the benefits which he has obtained under the contract, he will be
held to a satisfaction of his agreement by paying an equivalent in money.
A consideration of the case as one of eviction is interesting and not
beside the point. The lessee is undoubtedly deprived of the entire beneficial
use of the premises for the lease was solely for the purpose in question. The
case is closely analagous to an eviction by eminent domain. In these cases the
New York rule seems to be that the covenant to pay rent is not rescinded,
but this conclusion is reached on the theory that the lessee is compensated by
the State; Folz v. Huntley, 7 Wend. 210. In the present case there being
no compensation the opposite conclusion would seem justifiable. For a discussion of this question see 58 Univ. of Penn. Law Rev. 98.
MASTER
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LAWoR.-In

Norman v. Virginia-Pocahontas Coal Co., 69 S. E. 857 (gio) W. Va., the
plaintiff, a boy under fourteen years of age, was employed by the defendants
in a mine and was injured in the course of his employment. A statute in the
jurisdiction provides that: "No boy under fourteen years of age shall be
permitted to work in any coal mine," etc. The decision is the original one
in the jurisdiction and the authorities on the various phases of the question
are reviewed at some length. It was held that "the violation of the statute
is actionable negligence whenever that violation is the natural and proximate
cause of an injury. If the very injury has happened which was intended
to be prevented by the statute law, that injury must be considered as directly
caused by the non-observance of the law." As to contributory negligence, it
was held that the intention of the legislature was to prevent injury to the
immature by their own contributory negligence through the curiosity, indiscretion or heedlessness that naturally belongs to their age; that, therefore,
when it is shown that the person in question is fully cognizant of the dangers which he is encountering, the defence of contributory negligence should
be allowed.
The decision seems to be in accord with the weight of authority. Marino
v. Lehmaier, i73 N. Y. 530 (1903); Lee v. Sterling Mfg. Co., 134 N. Y. App.
123 (1o9); Evans v. American Iron & Tube Co., 42 Fed. 519 (18go);
Darsam v. Kohlmann, 123 La. 464 (9og); Nickey v. Steuder, 164 Ind. 189
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(19o4); Thompson: Negligence Vol. 4, No. 3827, and authorities there cited.
There are numerous cases, however, holding that the mere employment of
a minor contrary to the statute is more than "some evidence of negligence"
but is negligence per se. Rolin v. Tobacco Co.. 141 N. C. 3oo (i9o6);
Sterling v. Union Carbide Co., T42 Mich. 284 (i9o5) ; Syneszewski v. Schmidt,
1i6 N. W. 1107 (Mich. 19o8); Fitzgerald v. International Flax Twine Co..
104 Minn. r38 (198) ; Woolf v. Nauman Co.. 128 Ia. 261 (io5) ; Smith's
Admr. v. Natl. Coal & Iron Co.. 117 S. W. 28o (Ky. T909). In the above
cases, the defence of contributory negligence was or would have been
allowed.
It is interesting to note that two members of the court in the leading
case dissented as to the defence of contributory negligence being open to the
employer. This view, although in the minority, is well substantiated by
authority. Lenahan v. Pittston Coal Co., 218 Pa. 311 (19o7); Stehle v.
Jaeger Automatic Machine Co., 225 Pa. 348 (igog); American Car Co. v.
Armentrout, 214 11.509 (io5); Iron & Wire Co. v. Green, lo8 Tenn. i6I
(19o1).

In considering the problem of the defences available to the employer
when injury results to an employe from the breach of a statutory duty by
the employer, the cases of Narramore v. C. C. C. & St. L. Rwy., 96 Fed.
298 (r899), and St. Louis Cordage Co. v. Miller, 126 Fed. 495 (9o3), and
the cases following either authority are immediately recalled. The principles involved in assumption of risk and in this case are substantially the
same. Is the intention of the legislature in forbidding child labor to prevent it as a social wrong or should the common law rules as to civil liability
remain unaltered? If the latter position is assumed, the courts regard the
action of the legislature from an individualistic and not from a social standpoint. It would seem that to carry out the true intention of the legislature,
the rule making the employers' liability absolute is preferable.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-WATER SuPPLY-NEGLIGENCE.-In Keener v.
City of Mankato. 129 N. W. 158 (Minn. i9Io), the complainants charged
that the defendant city allowed the supPly in its waterworks system to become polluted with poisonous substances and large quantities of filth and

sewage to escape into. and saturate it, by reason whereof the plaintiff's intestate contracted typhoid fever and died. The defendants demurred. It
was held that the municipality was liable for its negligence in its corporate
capacity and was not exempt because it was carrying out a governmental
function.
It is well recognized that municipal corporations are possessed of dual
the one governmental, legislative, or public; the other proprietary or
powers,
private. s Dillon Mun. Corp. 4th Ed., §22, and cases cited. 5 Thompson
Neg. 258 and cases cited, Bailey v. Mayor of City of New York, 3 Hill

(N. Y.) 531 O1W4).

Acts held to be in the performance of this latter function are improving

or grading a highway, street or sidewalk. Allentown v. Kramer, 73 Pa. St.
406 (i873); Clemence v. Auburn, 66 N. Y. 334 (1876); digging a sewer,
Rome v. Portsmouth, 56 N. H. 29T (1876); building a bridge, Stone v. Au-

gusta, 46 Me. 127 (1858); constructing a culvert. Ross v. Clinton, 46 Iowa
606 (1877) ; erecting and maintaining a public building. Chicago v. O'Brennan,
65 Ill. 16o (T872); contra: where building was a public school building, Hill
v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344 (1877).
With respect to its water system the rights, powers and duties of a
municipal corporation are interpreted the same as in the case of an individual
or private corporation. Lynch v. Springfield, '74 Mass. 430 (y899); Galves139
ton v. Posnainsky, 62 Tex. 1 8 (1884); Wagner v. Rock Island, 146 Ill.
Mead(1893); Memphis v. Lasser. 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 757 (1849); White v.Esbergville, 177 Pa. 643 (1896); Augusta v. Mackey, 113 Ga. 64 (19ol);
Gemst Cigar Co. v. City of Portland, 55 Pac. 961 (1899) ; Booth v. Fulton, 85
Mo. App. i6 (igoo).
And though it has been held that a city is not liable for sickness or
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death caused by drindking impure water from a free public well established
and maintained by its authority in one of its streets, in which it bad placed
a pump for free public use Danaher v. Brooklyn, 5z Hun 563 (N. Y. i8f9);
in the principal case the defendant by demurrer acknowledged its negligence;
and so the decision would seem to be in line with the cases holding a mampal corporation liable for negligence in the construction or management of
waterworks whereby a private person is injured. Stock v. City of Boston,
8
49 Mass 41O (11
99); City of Ironton v. Kelley, 38 Ohio St. 5o (iESb);
Ysleta v. Babbitt 8 Tex. O-v. App. 432 (i894); Wilkins v. Rutland, 6I Vt.
336 (I8);
Danmum v. St Louis, z52 Mo. I86 (z899); Rinser Y. Phila.
E71 Pa- 63 (1895); Lockwood v. City of Dover, 73 N. H. 209 (1go5).
NE~LAo
or Co Lnhcro EPuwyI By lsson lm DA oF
SuFEom By Lssm-A municipality leased a street railway to an
operting company, covenanting to keep the roadway in repair. In performance of the contract the city awarded a contract for the relaying of
certain track in which the contractor agreed to save the city harmless from
all damages that might result. The contractor so negligently performed the
work that a car belonging to the operating company was wrecked. HeldThe contractor was liable to the operating company for all damage causea
by his negligent acts. The mutual rights of the parties were not founded
upon, nor affected by, the complicated contracts which appeared in the case.
Birmingham Tramway Co. v. Law [I91O, 2 K. B. 965.
The authorities uniformly support this decision. Where a contractor
undertakes to perform an act which, if not done with skill and care, may
cause injury to a third party, the law, ipso facto, imposes upon him a duty
to use such skill and care, for breach of what obligation an action in tort
will always lie. Casey v. Bridge Co., z'4 Mo. Ap. 47 (zgo5). This duty
does not depend upon, or grow out of, the contract which merely explains
the contractor's presence, Bickford v. Richards, z54 Mass. 163 (r89r); though
the same act may be a tort of negligence as to one party, and a breach of
contract as to another, Schutte v. Electric Co, 68 N. J. L 435 (19o2).
Where the work, if performed according to the contract will necessarily
and obviously cause injury to a third party, both the contractor and the person
employing him are liable, Murray v. Arthur, 98 II. App. 331 (rgor); but if
the defect in the employer's plan is not such as must obviously cause damage,
the contractor is not liable in the absence of negligence on his part, Bell &
Son v. Kidd & Roberts, 68 S. F_. Rep. 6o7 (Ga. ipog). If the work has been
completed and turned over to the owner, the contractor's liability to third
persons, even for negligence, ceases, Galbraith v. Steel Co, 133 Fed. 485
('go4) ; except where the contractor has constructed or repaired an inherently dangerous machine, as an elevator, Kahner v. Otis Elevator Co., 96
Ap. Div. I6g (N. Y. x9o4).
Except in Cobb v. Clark Co, i8 Ga. 483 (i9o3), where a contrary
dictum is clearly erroneous, the courts have in cases dealing with the negligence of contractors avoided the confusion found in analogous cases where
manufacturers and venders of property have been negligent, which confusion
is caused by the incorrect conception that the recovery, if any, of a third
party must be for breach of contract. See Bohlen; Affirmative Obligation
in the Law of Torts, 53 Amer. Law Reg. 29o.
Ams

QuAsr-CoNTRAcrs--WJvz oF TorT Aim Sure nz Assumapsrr.-An exposition society gave the owner of a gravity railway a license to erect and
operate it on their premises during an exposition season. At the end of the
season the licensee was in arrears for rent, and did not remove the railway.
The society subsequently leased the land with the railway upon it, to other
parties; and about a year afterwards the railway was destroyed by fire.
Held: That the exposition society was liable in assumpsit for the value of
the railway. Rees and Sons Co. v. Western Exposition Society, 44 Pa. Super.
38r (i9io).
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It is too well settled to admit of doubt that if any one in the commission
of a tort enriches himself by taking or using the property of another, the
lat may. in some cases, instead of sueing in tort to recover damages for
the injury done, sue in assumpsit for the value of that which has been
tortiously taken or used. Keener, Quasi-Contracts, 159. The only question
of doubt concerns the rmits of a plaintiff's right to waive the tort and sue
in assumpsit
When the suit is in assuupsit for money had and received, the general
rule is that the mere wrongful detention of property is not sufficient to
establish a basis for the plaintiff's waiver of his tort action, and suit ex
contractu. The goods must be turned into money or its equivalent. Cragg v.
Arendale, '13 Ga x& (zgoi). The theory on which this rule proceeds is
that until the wrongdoer has received money to which the owner of the
property is entitled, there can be no action for money had and received,
or upon an implied promise to pay. Nat Trust Co. v. Gleason, 77 N. Y.
4o (z8). Applying this theory, it has been held that where the tort-feaser
sold property, but the plaintiff failed to -show what amount of money the
wrongdoer received, he could not sue for money had and received. Glasscock v. Hazel, ro9 N. C i45 (I89). So also where the wrongdoer converted a certificate of shares in a corporation, and surrendered it to the corporation in exchange for a new certificate in his own name. Hagar v- Norton,
188 Mass. 47 (igo5). However, a sale will be implied under certain circumstances, as where a person is entrusted with property to sell for a fixed
price, and he refuses either to re-deliver the property or account for the
proceeds. Lord Mansfield, in Longchamp v. Kenny, i Doug. 137 (1779).

But

this presumption ought certainly not be raised in the face of facts which
conclusively negative the idea that a sale occurred.
Where the plaintiff waives his tort remedy, and sues for goods sold and
delivered, there is a great contrariety of opinion as to whether he can recover.
A number of jurisdictions hold that he can. See Keener, Quasi-Contracts,
193 and cases cited. It is submitted that these cases entirely obliterate the
distinction between actions ex delicto and actions ex contractu, where the
action is founded on a tort in the conversion of personal property. Taking
this view, many American courts refuse to allow waiver of tort in favor
of this form of contractual action. Jones v. Hoar, 22 Mass. 285 (1827);
Kidney v. Parsons, 4Y Vt. 39o (1868); Keener, Quasi-Contracts, 194.
The courts of Pennsylvania in the early cases, seemed to follow the rule
that the tort action can be waived only when the goods have been sold, and
the seller has received money as a- consideration. Willet v. Willet, 3 Watts
277 (1834); Satterlee v. Melick, 76 Pa. 65 (1874). But in Balliet v. Brown,
103 Pa. 551 (1883), it was said: "Where there is a conversion, there is an
implied sale, and waiving the tort, an action of assumpsit for goods sold and
delivered can be maintained upon the contract implied." If this rule be
followed, it is only necessary to show a conversion in order to establish the
right of election between the two forms of action.
In Rees and Sons Co. v. Western Exposition Society, supra, the Superior
Court has gone further than either of the appellate courts of the State have
gone before in .applying the rule announced in Balliet v. Brown. Plainly the
action could not be supported as for money had and received since the defendant had not sold the gravity railroad, and had not, therefore, received money
for its value. The case seems to rest on the bare fact that by leasing the
plaintiffs property to a stranger, the defendant asserted rights of ownership in it; and that he had, therefore, impliedly promised to pay for it. The
effect of the decision would seem to be to allow an action of assumpsit in
any case where the defendant is guilty of a conversion of the plaintiff's
property.
SuRET snw--L- AB

Y OF SuREYY AFrm

DISCHARGE OF PRINCipAL iN

BA xRUprcy.-It has been recently decided in Michigan that the surety on
an appeal bond in an attachment suit is liable; though his principal has been
relieved of liability by a discharge in bankruptcy. Brown and Brown Coal
Co. v. Antezak, [28 N. W. Rep. 774 (Mich. xo).
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The decision depends on the construction to be given to §16 of the National Bankruptcy Law of 1898, which provides that "The liability of a
person, who is a co-debtor with, or a guarantor, or in any manner a surety,
for, a bankrupt, shall not be altered by the discharge of such bankrupt."
Act of July 1, 1898, c. 541, §16, 3o Stat. 55o (U. S. Comp. Stat. 19Ol, p. 3428).
The opinion states that, as this is a federal statute, "the construction it has
received in the federal courts should control, if that construction is not
inconsistent with our own decisions, and is, as we believe it to be, in accordance with the principles of justice." As the court here points out, the interpretation of the above section of the Bankruptcy Law adopted in this case
is that of the federal courts. In re Albrecht, 17 N. B. R. 287; and dicta in
Hill v. Harding, 107 U. S. 631, and Wolf v. Stix, 99 U. S. T. This same
view is adopted in the majority of the jurisdictions where the question has
been raised. Farrell v. Finch, 40 Ohio St. 337; Ray v. Brenner, 12 Kans.
T05; Knapp v. Anderson, et al., I5 N. B. R. 316 (N. Y.); and Fisse v. Einstein, 5 Mo. App. 78, which decides the matter as res integra in that State,
and reviews the authorities. The reasoning adopted in these cases is that
the surety's liability depends in nine cases out of ten upon just such a contingency as has here occurred, and that to allow him to avoid liability because
of the discharge in bankruptcy of his principal would be to practically nullify
the section of the Bankruptcy Law, quoted above, as far as it applies to such
cases as the present, and to enable a debtor to thwart the diligence of his
creditor.
Those jurisdictions, which hold that the surety is relieved from liability
by the discharge in bankruptcy of his principal, do so on the ground that
the surety's obligation is to pay, in case of default of his principal, the
judgment to be obtained in the appellate court, not the original debt; and.
therefore, since the appeal, which has been stayed until the determination
of the bankruptcy question, cannot be continued to final judgment, because of
such discharge of the appellant, the obligation, or debt, which the surety
has bound himself to pay. does not exist, and cannot be determined. Odell
v. Wooten, 38 Ga. 224: Martin v. Kilbourn, I Cent. L. J. 94 (Tenn.); Carpenter v. Tuwell, 100 Mass. 450.

